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Tax incidence is the study of who bears the economic burden of a tax.  More
generally, it is the positive analysis of the impact of taxes on the distribution of welfare
within a society.  It begins with the very basic insight that the person who has the legal
obligation to make a tax payment may not be the person whose welfare is reduced by the
existence of the tax.  The statutory incidence of a tax refers to the distribution of those
legal tax payments – based on the statutory obligation to remit taxes to the government.
Thus, for example, the statutory burden of the payroll tax in the United States is shared
equally between employers and employees.  Economists, quite rightly, focus on the
economic incidence, which measures the changes in economic welfare in society arising
from a tax.  The standard view of the economic incidence of the payroll tax in the United
States is that it is borne entirely by employees.
Economic incidence differs from statutory incidence because of changes in
behavior and consequent changes in equilibrium prices.  Consumers buy less of a taxed
product, so firms produce less and buy fewer inputs – which changes the net price or
return to each input.  Thus the job of the incidence analyst is to determine how those
other prices change, and how those price changes affect different groups of individuals.
Across existing studies that analyze distributional effects of taxes, Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980) note that economists have used five different ways of dividing taxpayers
into groups.  First, some focus on the impact of taxes on consumers as opposed to
producers or suppliers of factors (such as labor, capital, and land).  A partial equilibrium
diagram can identify both the loss of consumer surplus and the loss of producer surplus
resulting from a tax.  Second, some narrow the focus to analyze the impact of a tax
specifically on the relative demands for different factors and the returns to those factorsFullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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(such as capital, labor, or land).  The path-breaking general equilibrium analysis of
Harberger (1962) simply ignores the consumer side by assuming that everybody spends
their money the same way, and then he derives the burden of a sector specific tax on
capital as opposed to labor.  Third, some studies group individuals or households by some
measure of economic well-being.  Any such classification then allows the researcher to
analyze the progressivity of a tax or tax system (see, for example, Musgrave, et al.
(1974), Devarajan, et al. (1980), and Pechman (1985) for early examples using large
scale data sets).  Typically, taxpayers are grouped by some measure of income, and then
the data show how much each group earns from each factor and how much each group
spends on each product.  Pechman and Okner (1974) is perhaps the classic analysis of the
U.S. tax system that groups taxpayers by annual income, while Fullerton and Rogers
(1993) group taxpayers by a measure of lifetime resources.  Fourth, taxes can be
evaluated on the basis of regional incidence.  Such analysis might focus on regional
differences within a country (e.g. Bull, et al. (1994)), or it might focus on international
differences.  Finally, taxes can have intergenerational effects.  For example, the creation
of a tax and transfer system that is partially or wholly debt funded will bring about a
transfer from future generations to members of the current generation (but see Barro
(1974) for a dissenting view).
The taxonomy above alludes to partial and general equilibrium analysis.  Partial
equilibrium analysis focuses on the impact of a tax in one market, ignoring its impact on
other markets.  It was used by economists long before any of the papers collected in this
volume, but it is still appealing because of its analytical tractability and intuition.  For
example, Figure 1 shows how a tax on a commodity raises the gross-of-tax price to  Pg
and reduces the net price to  Pn.  The loss in consumer surplus (the light-shaded area) isFullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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larger than the loss in producer surplus (the dark-shaded area), because demand in this
case is relatively inelastic compared to supply.  Also, the commodity in this figure could
be labor, in which case the tax is borne more by the firm as the inelastic buyer of labor,
compared to the worker as supplier of that labor.
Figure 1: A Simple Partial Equilibrium Model of Tax Incidence
This model does not tell us much about other complicated problems, however,
such as the corporate income tax.  Thus, modern incidence analysis began with
Harberger's (1962) introduction of the general equilibrium model into public finance.  A
general equilibrium model can be designed to track the impact of a tax from one market
to another, accounting for price changes throughout the economy in a way that insures
equilibrium in all markets simultaneously.  Harberger's original model is a fairly simple
representation of an economy with two factors and two products, and it is used to find theFullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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effects of the corporate income tax on the return to capital relative to the wage rate and
the price of corporate output relative to the price of other goods.
We begin this book with Harberger (1962), as the beginning of modern incidence
analysis, and we follow it with the diagrammatic exposition of McLure (1974).  This first
section also includes two early studies that try to employ general equilibrium and other
incidence results to guide the use of much data to allocate the burden of all taxes across
all households in the United States.  Then Section II provides a number of studies that
extend this static framework in a number of directions, including more factors, more
sectors, other existing taxes, large tax changes, and computational general equilibrium
models.  Because all those models assume perfect competition, however, Section III
backtracks to a partial equilibrium setting in order to look at tax incidence with imperfect
competition.  We then return to static general equilibrium models in Section IV in order
to study the important application of this analysis to property taxation.  In Section V, we
turn to early dynamic models that allow the analysis of the impact of taxation on savings,
investment, and the capital stock.  These models in some cases consider transition
dynamics as the economy moves from pre-tax to post-tax equilibrium.  Finally, in Section
VI, we discuss some of the most recent work on lifetime incidence.  This work reflects
the state of the art in both theoretical and applied incidence analysis.
I. Early Incidence Theory and Calculations
Without a doubt, Harberger (1962) is the progenitor of the modern field of general
equilibrium incidence analysis.
1  In addition to providing a framework for analyzing the
corporate income tax, Harberger's approach can be used to analyze a wide array of taxes.
                                                
1 His is not the first such analysis, however.  See, for example, Brown (1939) and Musgrave (1953).Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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He models the corporate income tax as a partial factor tax, that is, a tax on the use of one
factor in one sector.  It thus affects relative factor prices and relative output prices.
Harberger (1962) not only provides the basic theoretical framework for all general
equilibrium tax incidence analysis, he also began the empirical work in this literature.
His original paper considers plausible parameter values and likely empirical outcomes.
Depending on the empirical assumptions, sometimes capital bears less than the full
burden of the corporate income tax, and sometimes it bears more than the full burden of
the tax.  The main message coming out of this paper, however, is that capital is likely to
bear approximately the full burden of the corporate income tax.  And capital mobility
means that the burden is on all capital, not just corporate capital.  Our understanding of
Harberger's model has been significantly improved by other papers that we include in this
volume.  In particular, McLure (1974) provides a very useful graphical exposition that
has become standard in the literature.
Included in the first set of papers in this volume are two studies that use insights
from both partial and general equilibrium tax incidence theory to derive empirical
estimates of the burden of taxes using large-scale data sets.  One of the key theoretical
insights applied in these studies is that the side of a market that is relatively price inelastic
bears a larger burden of the tax than the more price elastic side.  Consider, for example,
the payroll tax.  If the elasticity of labor supply is high relative to the elasticity of labor
demand, as drawn in Figure 1 above, then the owners of the firm will bear most of the
burden of the tax in the form of lower returns to capital (or else consumers will bear the
burden in the form of higher product prices).  If labor supply is relatively inelastic, as
most economists believe, however, then workers will disproportionately bear the burden
of this tax in the form of lower after-tax wages.  For excise taxes on output, the standardFullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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model with constant returns to scale and perfect competition would imply that the supply
curve in Figure 1 is flat, and so the burden is fully borne by consumers.
Another key theoretical insight applied in these models is the Harberger result that
the corporate income tax is likely to be borne not just by investors in the corporate sector,
but by all capital owners.  At the same time, Harberger's model can be used to show how
the price of corporate output rises relative to the price of non-corporate output, so if all
households are not all identical then consumers of corporate output bear disproportionate
burdens as well.  In addition, McLure's (1974) paper with an immobile factor shows that
the tax burden might stay on corporate capital.  Thus the issue is not completely settled,
as alternative theories still imply alternative results.  To apply each of these theories, one
needs data on each income group's sources of income and spending on each output.
Pechman and Okner (1974) and Musgrave, et al. (1974) are good examples of this
type of analysis.  First, they must specify how the burden of each tax is shifted.  Then,
each scenario is applied to micro-data on households’ sources and uses of income.
Pechman and Okner merge data files for a sample of 72,000 households.  They use
information on demographic characteristics such as age and family size, and tax return
items such as income from dividends, interest, rent, capital gains, and wages and salaries.
They classify households into annual income groups using a measure of economic
income that includes transfers, the household’s share of corporate retained earnings, and
the imputed net rental income from owner-occupied homes.  For each set of assumptions
about the shifting of each tax, they add up the burdens for each household.  Pechman and
Okner assume for all cases that the burden of the personal income tax remains with the
household, the employee part of the payroll tax remains with the worker, and the burden
of sales and excise taxes falls on households according to their consumption patterns.Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
January, 2002 p. 7
The employer share of the payroll tax is sometimes allocated entirely to workers, and it is
sometimes allocated equally between workers and consumers.  The property tax is
assumed to affect either the return to landowners specifically or all capital owners
generally.  Finally, for the corporate income tax, they consider several cases with
different proportions of the burden on shareholders, capital owners, wage-earners, and
consumers.
For each combination of assumptions, Pechman and Okner calculate the effective
tax rate on each household, defined as the total tax burden as a fraction of economic
income.  Their results indicate that the most-progressive set of assumptions do not yield
results that are markedly different from the least-progressive set of assumptions.  In either
case, the overall U.S. tax system is roughly proportional over the middle eight deciles.
The effective tax rate is higher, however, at the top and bottom tails of the income
distribution.  At very low-income levels, any positive consumption implies a positive
sales tax burden divided by a small income in the denominator.  At the other end of the
distribution, the rate is high because of the progressive personal income tax and assumed
corporate tax burdens from disproportionate holding of corporate stock.
This finding of rough proportionality then helped to shape tax policy debates for
the next three decades.  The general consensus is that the progressive effects of the
personal income tax and the corporate income tax are more-or-less offset by the
regressive impacts of payroll taxes, sales taxes, and excise taxes.
Musgrave, et al. (1974) employ similar assumptions and reach similar
conclusions, but they also discuss some methodological issues.  They show how theFullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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pattern of effective tax rates depends on the income concept used in the denominator.
2
They also discuss the importance of the question to be answered (suggesting the use of
pre-tax income to calculate the effects of imposing the tax system, but post-tax income to
measure the effects of eliminating taxes).  Finally, in addition, they proceed to calculate
the distributional effects of government spending.  They assume that some spending can
be allocated, like education spending to families with children in school, and highway
spending in proportion to auto expenses.  Other spending that cannot be allocated is
assumed to benefit families (a.) in proportion to total income, (b.) in proportion to tax
burdens, or (c.) on a per capita basis.   To varying degrees, all such assumptions yield
considerable overall redistribution, with net benefits (after tax burdens) that are positive
for the poor and negative for the rich.  The rest of this volume focuses only on the
distribution of tax burdens.
While those two papers found tax burdens to be roughly proportional over most of
the income scale, the next paper in this volume by Browning (1985) finds that the U.S.
tax system as a whole is highly progressive.  He assumes that sales and excise taxes raise
product prices, but government transfers are indexed to provide the same real benefits,
thus protecting low-income transfer recipients.  Thus these tax burdens do not fall on
consumption generally, but only on consumption out of factor income.  Even more
generally, he points out, the actual indexation of transfers does not matter: the definition
                                                
2 The use of money income in the denominator makes the effective tax rates more progressive, because
higher income households have a lower denominator while still paying the corporate income tax by
assumption, but Musgrave et al. note that "with the entire corporation tax included in the numerator of the
effective rate ratio, consistency calls for inclusion of total corporate source income (and not only of
dividends) in the denominator" (p.271).Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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of differential tax incidence holds constant all government expenditures, and constant
real government transfers means that the burden of sales taxes must fall on factors.
3
The approach pioneered by these authors continues to be followed today by many
economists inside and outside of government agencies.  See, for example, the papers by
Dickert, et al. (1994), Kasten, et al. (1994), and Gale, et al. (1996).  This approach also
forms the foundation for the distributional analyses undertaken by the U.S. Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the U.K. Office for
National Statistics.
4
II. General Equilibrium Analysis
Many economists saw the potential of Harberger's (1962) methodology, and they
have been extending it ever since.  The first such paper included in this volume is by
McLure and Thirsk (1975), who provide a simplified version of the Harberger model that
allows incidence to be calculated "on the back of an envelope."  This approach uses
specific functional forms, which also allows the model to be applied to "large" tax
changes (as opposed to Harberger's comparative static approach that only allows analysis
of incremental tax changes).  In the next paper, Vandendorpe and Friedlaender (1976)
extend the original Harberger model by relaxing many of the restrictive assumptions.
These assumptions were used by Harberger to obtain tractable formulas, but
Vandendorpe and Friedlaender show how to use less restrictive assumptions while still
                                                
3 The point about indexation is first made by Browning and Johnson (1979), and the generalization is in the
Browning (1985) paper included in this volume.
4 See Bradford (1995) for a discussion and critique of this type of analysis in the United States.  For the
United Kingdom, Lakin (2001) reports figures that are very similar in nature to those for the U.S.: "The
proportion of gross income paid in direct tax by the top fifth of households is almost double that paid by
those in the bottom fifth: 24 per cent compared with 13 per cent. Indirect taxes have the opposite effect to
direct taxes taking a higher proportion of income from those with lower incomes" (p.35).  We cannot know
whether the similarity of results is because of similar methodology or because of similar policies.Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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obtaining tractable formulas.  Whereas Harberger analyzed only a small corporate tax
with no other taxes, for example, Vandendorpe and Friedlaender allow for a small change
in any large pre-existing tax.  The Vandendorpe and Friedlaender analysis is quite
interesting because of the extent to which they can elaborate the Harberger model without
becoming overwhelmed by messy and intractable formulas.
General equilibrium models have been used in other contexts.  A basic finding
from partial equilibrium analysis is that any inelastically-supplied factor of production
bears the full burden of a tax on that factor.  Because land is inelastically supplied,
economists presume that a tax on land is borne by the landowner.  Feldstein (1977)
reverses that result in a model where land serves not only as a factor of production but
also as an asset.  A tax on land rent then induces investors to increase holdings of other
assets in their portfolios.  The resulting increase in reproducible, physical capital can then
lead to an increase in the wage rate and a decrease in the return to physical capital.
Hence, part of the tax on land rent is shifted to capital, with wage rates rising in response
to the greater capital-labor ratio.
In another counterintuitive paper included in this volume, Bradford (1978)
reverses the common presumption that international mobility of capital yields an elastic
supply of capital at a fixed world rate of return, and so capital cannot bear the burden of a
local tax on capital.  Bradford shows that capital does indeed bear the burden of a local
tax on capital, in the aggregate.  The tax burden is not on local investors but is spread
across all investors worldwide.
The analytical general equilibrium literature following Harberger (1962) grew
exponentially, as did the accessibility and power of computers, which together
engendered a large and important literature in computable general equilibrium analysis.Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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Economists then showed how computers could be used to solve large and complex
general equilibrium models, and hence to provide analyses of more realistic tax systems.
One of the early and important papers in this literature is Shoven (1976), which we
present in this volume.
5  Whereas Harberger analyzed a small tax change for two sectors,
Shoven's computational model analyzes a large corporate tax and provides detailed
results for twelve sectors.  Still, however, he shows that a two-sector aggregation of his
model provides results that are very similar to Harberger's.  We also include a paper by
Devarajan, et al. (1980) that compares the Pechman and Musgrave, et al.  (1974)
approach to results from a computable general equilibrium model. They find that the
Pechman and Musgrave approach nicely approximates the computational model except to
the extent that output is produced using factors in proportions that are far different from
the average, or to the extent that certain groups receive income from factors in
proportions that are far different from the average.
III. Incidence with Imperfect Competition
The models discussed above assume that markets are perfectly competitive.
While many of the insights from this literature carry over to models with imperfectly
competitive markets, some important differences arise.  For example, when markets are
perfectly competitive, unit taxes and ad valorem taxes have the same incidence impact
(when the two types of tax rates are set to collect the same amount of revenue).   Bishop
(1968) carried out an early analysis of ad valorem and unit taxes under monopoly,
building on earlier work by Suits and Musgrave (1953).  As Bishop's paper in this
volume shows, the two types of taxes lead to different equilibria in the presence of a
                                                
5 See Shoven and Whalley (1984) for a history of the development of this literature.Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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monopolist.  This difference raises the possibility of "over-shifting," which occurs when
the consumer price rises by more than the tax (in the case of a commodity tax).
Models of tax incidence in oligopolistic markets began to appear in the early
1980s.  The paper by Kay and Keen (1983) in this volume introduces taxes into the
circular location model of Salop (1979).  With oligopolistic markets, consumer welfare
can be affected by mechanisms other than changes in price and quantity.  If consumers
value product diversity, part of the burden of the tax can be felt in the form of reduced
utility from reduced equilibrium product variety.  The Kay and Keen model illustrates
this clearly.  The next two papers in the volume analyze tax incidence in models with
homogenous goods and Cournot-Nash oligopolies.  Katz and Rosen (1985) make the
important point that results from this type of model do not lie between those of perfect
competition and monopoly models.  Indeed, it is not appropriate to view perfect
competition and monopolies as polar extremes, as if oligopolistic markets' responses to
taxes were some weighted average of the two.  Like Katz and Rosen, Stern (1987)
extends the analysis to consider models with a fixed number of firms, but then he also
considers free-entry oligopolies (or "monopolistic competition" in Stern's vocabulary).
His paper extends important work on tax incidence in oligopolistic markets by Seade
(1985).
6
Building on Stern's model, Delipalla and Keen (1992) extend the analyses of Suits
and Musgrave and Bishop to compare and contrast ad valorem and unit taxes in
oligopolistic markets.  We include this paper here, as it brings together a number of
strands of incidence analysis (such as market structure and instrument choice) that have
been explored separately in the various papers described above.Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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IV. Property Taxation
General equilibrium analysis has radically changed economists' thinking about the
incidence of property taxes.  We begin with a paper by Mieszkowski (1972) that recounts
and reconciles alternative views.  First, the property tax has been viewed as an excise tax
on housing services that is regressive because housing expenditures are a high proportion
of low-income budgets.  This "old view" is typically associated with Simon (1943), but it
dates back to Edgeworth (1897).  Second, the property tax has been viewed as a profits
tax on capital income that is progressive because capital is a high proportion of high-
income sources.  This view is called the "new view," although it originates with Brown
(1924).  Perhaps it is new relative to Edgeworth (1897)!
7
Mieszkowski's contribution is to reconcile these views in a Harberger general
equilibrium modeling framework.  If   i τ   is the tax rate on property in community  i,  we
can decompose the rate into two components as   i i ε τ τ + =   where  τ   is the average
property tax rate over the entire country, and   i ε   is the deviation of the local rate from
the national average.  By construction, the average of  i ε   across all communities is zero.
Mieszkowski argues that the first component of   i τ   can be viewed as a national tax on
housing capital at rate  τ .  Using the Harberger framework, he then argues that this tax
burdens all capital.  The second component, Mieszkowski continues, can be viewed as a
differential tax that can be positive or negative.  This differential tax might be passed
forward to consumers of housing or passed backwards to immobile factors (workers or
                                                                                                                                                
6   See also Besley (1989) and Besley and Suzumura (1992) for further elaboration of these models.
7 The property tax has also been viewed as a tax on site rents that is shifted to landowners. Marshall
(1890) provides an early statement of this "classical" view, but Simon (1943) points out that classicalFullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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landowners).  Mieszkowski concludes that the bulk of this differential tax is passed
forward to consumers.
Even in Mieszkowski's model, note that the regressivity of the tax depends on
what sort of tax change is contemplated.  A uniform nation-wide increase in property tax
would impact capital income, which is progressive under the "new" view.  In contrast, a
single community's increase in property tax would likely raise that town's cost of
housing, which is regressive under the "old" view.
We next include two papers by Musgrave (1974) and Aaron (1974), as they bring
a great deal of information about housing markets to bear on the Harberger-style analysis
in Mieszkowski (1972).  Musgrave generally supports the old view.  He notes, for
example, that many rental markets in urban areas are likely to be imperfectly competitive.
Thus, some of the insights from the papers in Section III of this book may be useful for
thinking about property tax incidence.  Aaron generally supports the new view.  He notes
that, even under the old view, the portion of the property tax falling on rental housing
may well be progressive since the ratio of market value to rent rises with rent (more
expensive houses have relatively low monthly rent).  These two papers point to the
importance of attention to institutional detail when undertaking incidence analyses.
Next, we include a paper by Hamilton (1976) that articulates a third view, called
the "benefit" view, that the property tax is neither regressive nor progressive because it is
really no tax at all.
8  Building on Tiebout (1956), Hamilton argues that mobile taxpayers
would not live in any jurisdiction that charges a tax higher than the value of its local
public goods and services – unless property values adjusted to reflect the differential
                                                                                                                                                
economists divide the property tax into a portion falling on land rents and a portion falling on
improvements.Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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between the value of services received and taxes paid (the "fiscal surplus").  In other
words, house prices would rise by the capitalized value of any positive stream of fiscal
surpluses or fall by the capitalized value of any negative stream (where taxes exceed local
services).  If the local property tax becomes a voluntary price paid for those local goods
and services, then it is no tax at all.  Thus, we have the “old” view, the “new” view, and
the “no” view of the property tax.
9
Hamilton's focus is on the efficiency impact of property taxes.  He argues that the
property tax per se has no distributional impact because of capitalization.  His story is not
complete yet, as he notes that the value of land is higher when used to construct housing
that is below the average value of housing in the community.  Because the property tax
on such a house would be less than the (uniform) services provided, the fiscal surplus for
such a house will be positive, and the landowner can extract those rents when selling the
site.  This shift in the mix of housing will lead to a shift in the burden of the property tax
from owners of below-average-value housing to owners of above-average-value housing.
In response, a countervailing political force will limit this shift (zoning or some other
form of regulation).  The outcome of this political process cannot be predicted in an
economic model, and zoning could be so restrictive as to limit the amount of low-value
housing to levels that are inefficient (and that lead to a shift of the burden of property tax
from high-value homeowners to low-value homeowners).  Hamilton concludes that it is
impossible to determine the incidence of property taxes until we have a better
understanding of the political forces influencing land-use policy.
                                                                                                                                                
8 This argument is first articulated in Hamilton (1975), but we include Hamilton (1976) because it
extends the argument to allow for heterogeneous communities.
9 Zodrow (2001) provides a possible reconciliation of these various views.Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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Finally, we present a paper by Oates (1969) that first attempts to measure
empirically the degree of capitalization of property taxes into property values.  Testing
empirically the degree of tax capitalization turns out to be a complicated statistical
exercise, and economists continue to disagree as to the degree of capitalization.  Many
economists believe that the benefit view should imply complete capitalization of property
taxes (holding public services and other amenities constant).  If so, then perhaps an
empirical test of capitalization could help us choose between the new and benefit views.
Alas, Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1985) point out that property taxes may be capitalized
under both the benefit view and the new view.  Thus, while capitalization is an important
phenomenon in tax incidence theory, it is not useful for sorting out the various views of
the property tax.
V. Incidence in Dynamic Models
Up to this point, we have ignored the impact of taxes on saving and investment.
We need models with intertemporal optimization to allow for endogenous saving and
investment.  The essential engine of long-run incidence in these models is the impact of
taxes on capital-labor ratios (and thus factor prices).   We shall also see, however, that
inelastic capital supply in the short-run plays an important role through asset price
revaluations in response to tax policy.  Anticipations also become important.
We first present a paper by Feldstein (1974) that develops a neoclassical growth
model to analyze the long-run incidence of a tax on capital income.  Feldstein concludes
that much (if not all) of the burden of the tax is shifted to workers in the form of lower
wages resulting from a decline in the capital-labor ratio. The conclusions from this model
are particularly stark in a two-class world in which all savings is from capital incomeFullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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only.  In this case, the entire capital income tax is borne by workers in the form of lower
wages.
Feldstein compares steady-state equilibria.  However, the transition from the old
to the new steady-state equilibrium could take many years, and welfare impacts of a tax
change during the transition could be quite different from those in the new steady state.
We include a paper by Bernheim (1981) that provides a way to think about the welfare
impact of a tax change along the entire path from old to new equilibrium.
10
In general, a complete picture of the burden of a capital income tax in a
neoclassical growth model such as Feldstein's would require the analyst to discount and
add up the workers’ gains and losses over time.  One simple way to measure the burden
shift would be to compute the present discounted value of the change in wage income
assuming some given discount rate.  We note four problems with this approach.  First, the
discount rate in this approach is exogenous but instead should be linked to consumer
preferences.  Second, it would be preferable to have some dynamic measure of
compensating or equivalent variation for the tax shift.  Third, the savings rate in this
model does not follow from consumer preferences.  Fourth, the savings rate depends only
on current information with no anticipations.
The switch from neoclassical growth model to life-cycle model can help solve
several of these problems.  The first major life-cycle model we include is by Summers
(1981).  He adds capital income taxation to the standard life-cycle model and argues that
traditional measures of the interest elasticity of savings are seriously understated.  This
paper dramatically alters the incidence and welfare impacts of capital income taxation.  It
does not include perfect foresight, however, which is the major contribution of the nextFullerton and Metcalf Introduction
January, 2002 p. 18
life-cycle model we include by Auerbach, et al. (1983).  They build an overlapping
generations (OLG) computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of an economy with a
representative agent in each cohort, and they use consumer preferences to calculate the
effects of a tax change on savings behavior.  They calculate not just the discounted
present value of gains and losses, but lifetime equivalent variations using the consumer's
own rate of time preference.  They show effects on those who are old or young at the
time of the tax change, as well as those not yet born.  Thus, this model and its subsequent
variants are very useful for understanding the inter-generational incidence of government
policies.
If the life-cycle model includes the possibility that utility can be derived from the
well-being of one's own children, then we have the infinite-life model.  This model can
also solve the four problems listed above, including the use of consumer preferences to
calculate endogenous savings and equivalent variations.  We next present an infinite-life
model by Judd (1985) that also calculates the effects of anticipations.  Consider, for
example, the announcement today of a temporary surtax on capital income for ten years
that will begin five years from now.  This announcement itself, if credible, should have
an impact on capital accumulation over the next five years – before the tax is actually
changed.
In the Judd (1985) paper, capital accumulation depends on preferences and, in
particular, the concavity of the utility function.  Costs of adjusting the capital stock play
no role.  More generally, however, firms might well incur significant costs during the
process of major investment projects.  The next paper in this volume, by Summers
                                                                                                                                                
10 Also, see Boadway (1979) for a discussion of the Feldstein model along the transition.Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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(1985), presents a simple partial equilibrium model to illustrate how corporate tax policy
can affect investment as well as the market value of capital in place.
VI. Lifetime Tax Incidence
In the last section of this volume, we turn to an area that has seen a burst of
research activity in the past few years.  Following the data-intensive exercises of
Pechman and Okner (1974) and Musgrave, et al. (1974) that classified households by
annual income, many economists noted that annual income is not necessarily a good
measure of one's overall level of well-being, for several reasons.  The low-annual-income
group may include four very different kinds of individuals: those with volatile annual
income who merely had a bad year, those who are young and just beginning a high-
income career, those who are old and just finished a high-income career, and those who
are truly poor.  To the extent that the tax burden for this aggregation is high or low, the
implications for policy are unclear.  Instead, the identification of those who are truly poor
requires a more permanent measure of income such as "lifetime income", the present
value of all wages plus inheritances.
An initial approach to this problem by Davies, et al. (1984) in this volume
captures lifetime income heterogeneity using a data-intensive exercise with incidence
assumptions in the style of Pechman and Okner (1974).  They find that a progressive tax
like the personal income tax is not as progressive on a lifetime basis because high-income
years with high taxes are added together with the same individual's low-income years and
low taxes.  For similar reasons, regressive taxes like sales and excise taxes are not as
regressive on a lifetime basis.  When all taxes are added together, the overall tax system
is roughly proportional, just as in Pechman and Okner (1974).Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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Empirical incidence analyses from a lifetime perspective suffer from the lack of
data on the entire lifetime income and consumption patterns of households.  Thus, any
attempt to apply the lifetime approach requires heroic assumptions.  In the Davies et al.
model, for example, all income streams are exogenous and the consumption path is based
on an additive isoelastic utility function.  Interest and growth rates are predetermined
based on Canadian data, and the model is then used to calculate life-cycle consumption,
income, tax payments, and government transfers.  Other empirical studies use annual data
to construct a proxy for lifetime income.  We next include a paper by Poterba (1989) that
invokes the Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) consumption-smoothing story to study U.S.
federal excise taxes.   With perfect life-cycle consumption smoothing, and with
individuals identical except for lifetime income levels, current consumption is
proportional to lifetime income.  Thus, Poterba can use data on one year's consumption to
categorize individuals by lifetime income.
11  We also include a paper by Caspersen and
Metcalf (1994) to illustrate the advances that follow the Poterba analysis.
Computable general equilibrium models also have been used to consider the
lifetime incidence of taxes.  Such a model can track a household over its entire economic
life, tracing income and consumption paths as well as all taxes paid in each period.  As
mentioned above, Auerbach, et al. (1983) use a CGE model with life-cycle savings
behavior of one representative agent in each cohort.  This model is very useful for inter-
generational incidence, but it cannot be used to study intra-generational redistribution
between rich and poor.  In contrast, other CGE models following Shoven (1976) can
                                                
11 Metcalf (1994) applies a similar idea to the system of state and local sales taxes in the United States and
finds that a case can be made for viewing this system of taxes as progressive, contrary to accepted wisdom.
The shift to a lifetime perspective is one important factor blunting the regressivity of state and local sales
taxes.  In addition, most states exempt a variety of goods with low income elasticities, thereby adding to the
progressivity of the system.Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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study redistribution between rich and poor on the basis of annual income but do not
incorporate life-cycle behavior.  Thus, the major goal of the book by Fullerton and
Rogers (1993) is to combine the best of both worlds: life-cycle decision-making of
households arrayed from rich to poor on the basis of lifetime income.  In other words,
they incorporate heterogeneity both in terms of age and in terms of lifetime income.
Some of the initial results of that book are summarized in the paper by Fullerton and
Rogers (1991) that is included in this volume.  Also, this paper includes a table showing
for each annual income decile how many individuals are estimated to be in each lifetime
income decile.  The diagonal of this matrix shows that only about 20 percent of
individuals are in the same decile by both measures.
Finally, we include a recent paper by Altig, et al. (2001) that represents the state-
of-the-art as of the publication of this volume (2002).  They build upon both the perfect
foresight life-cycle model of Auerbach, et al. (1983) and the 12 lifetime-income groups
of Fullerton and Rogers (1993).  They trace transition paths as well as steady-state
allocations, and they calculate the incidence of several fundamental tax reform proposals.
The switch to a flat tax does indeed reduce overall progressivity, even on a lifetime basis,
unless it is combined with sizeable exemptions.  Thus taxes still have major potential for
redistribution, not just explicitly through changes in tax liabilities but also implicitly
through price changes.
VII. Conclusion
Tax incidence is one of the central topics in public finance, and our understanding
of the concept has improved dramatically in this century.  We have deliberately chosen to
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include works only from the past forty years, even though other classic contributions date
back nearly two hundred years (see, for example, Cournot (1838)).
The papers in this volume are classics in the field while continuing to be
important references for modern researchers.  Even the first paper included here by
Harberger (1962) still provides the foundation for general equilibrium incidence, whether
through calculations of CGE models or through the intuition of analytical models.
Imperfect competition will remain an important topic as firms continue to merge in this
new century, and capitalization effects will remain important as new tax proposals are
announced and enacted.
In fact, we believe that both annual and lifetime incidence analysis will remain
important, as imperfect borrowing constraints mean that annual income is still relevant to
any individual who cannot borrow against future lifetime income.  Thus we are confident
that the papers included in this volume will stand the test of time.Fullerton and Metcalf Introduction
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